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HOW TO AVOID INCREASED DAMAGES AND
ATTORNEYS' FEES: THE DUTIES OF THE
ACCUSED INFRINGER AND THE PATENT
OWNER
BY KIRK

M.

HARTUNG*

I. Introduction
Increased damages and attorneys fees are specifically provided
for in the patent statutes. 35 U.S.C. section 284 provides, "When the
damages are not found by a jury, the Court shall assess them. In
either event, the court may increase the damages up to three times
the amount found or assessed."' 35 U.S.C. section 285 states, "The
court in exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney fees to the
prevailing party." 2 Thus, in all patent infringement cases, the potential for increased damages and attorney fees exists. Since its inception in October 1982, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit'
has had numerous opportunities to consider the standards for increased damages and attorney fees. Therefore, for the benefit of the
bar and businesses alike, an overview of the standards as set forth
by the Federal Circuit is provided.'

II. Standard for Increased Damages
Since 1793, the patent statutes have provided for trebling of
damages in patent infringement actions.5 The purpose of an increased damage award is both exemplary, in punishing and deterring
flagrant acts of patent infringement, and compensatory, in compensating the patent owner for immeasurable expenses and losses.' In* Partner, Zarley, McKee, Thomte, Voorhees & Sease, Des Moines, Iowa. J.D.
University of Iowa 1982, B.S. Iowa State University 1979.
1. 35 U.S.C.A. § 284 (1984).
2. 35 U.S.C.A. § 285 (1984).
3. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (C.A.F.C.) has exclusive jurisdiction of appeals from final decisions of United States District Courts if the jurisdiction of that court was based, in whole or in part on the patent statutes, including
issues of patent infringement. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1295 (1966).
4. Relevant C.A.F.C. cases through September 10, 1986 have been reviewed for
purposes of this article.
5. Patent Act of February 21, 1793, ch. 11, 5, 1 Stat. 318; See CHIsuM, PATENTS
§ 20.02(1][a] (1985).
6. CHISUM, PATENTS, § 20.03[4][b] (1985).

434

The John Marshall Law Review

[Vol. 20:433

creased damages discourage alleged infringers from using the judicial system where there is no real expectation of success. An award
of increased damages to the patent owner is generally conditioned
upon a finding of willful infringement s based on clear and convincing evidence. 9 As provided by 35 U.S.C. section 284, the award of
increased damages is in the discretion of the trial court. 10
A.

Willful Infringement

Willful infringement is a question of fact and thus reviewable
under the clearly erroneous standard. 1 While willful infringement
requires knowledge of an existing patent 2 such willful infringement
does not take time to develop."8 The fact that infringing conduct
commenced without knowledge of the patent, or even before the
patent issued, will not save an infringer who continues such conduct
after learning of the patent rights from increased damages for willful
infringement."

There are no hard and fast rules per se regarding willful infringement. 5 Generally, in determining whether or not infringing
conduct is willful, the district court must look at the totality of cir7. Kloster Speedstell AB v. Stora Kopparbergs Bergslags AB, 793 F.2d 1565,
1580 n.11 (Fed. Cir. 1982).
8. The C.A.F.C. has used the terms "willful," "wanton," "deliberate" and
"knowing," in describing infringing conduct wherein increased damages may be appropriate. E.g., Leinoff v. Louis Milona & Sons, Inc., 726 F.2d 734, 742 (Fed. Cir.
1984); Rosemount, Inc. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc., 727 F.2d 1540, 1547 (Fed. Cir.
1984). Since the court has not differentiated between such terms, they are believed to
be used synonymously.
9. E.g., Shatterproof Glass Corp. v. Libbey-Owens Ford Co., 758 F.2d 613, 628
(Fed. Cir. 1985). Willful infringement is a question of fact and therefore subject to
the clearly erroneous standard of review. Leinoff, 726 F.2d at 742-43. The discretionary award of increased damages based upon a finding of willful infringement is subject to the abuse of discretion standard of review on appeal. American Original Corp.
v. Jenkins Food Corp., 774 F.2d 459, 465 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
10. Leinoff v. Louis Milona & Sons, Inc., 726 F.2d 734, 742 (Fed. Cir. 1984). See
also S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc. v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 781 F.2d 198, 201-02 (Fed. Cir.
1986) (the trial court's refusal to increase damages despite a finding of willful infringement was remanded for clarification by the C.A.F.C.).
11. E.g., Kori Corp. v. Wilco Marsh Buggies and Draglines, Inc., 761 F.2d 649,
656 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 230 (1985).
12. E.g., State Industries, Inc. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 751 F.2d 1226, 1236 (Fed.
Cir. 1985). See also American Original Corp. v. Jenkins Food Corp., 774 F.2d 459, 465
(Fed. Cir. 1985) (knowledge of a pending patent application is insufficient); Power
Lift, Inc. v. Lang Tools, Inc., 774 F.2d 478 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (infringement was held to
be willful even though suit was commenced only nine days after the patent was
issued).
13. Ralston Purina Co. v. Far-Mar-Co., Inc., 772 F.2d 1570, 1577 (Fed. Cir.
1985).
14. E.g., Pacific Furniture Mfg. Co. v. Preview Furniture Corp., No. 86-787, slip
op. (Fed. Cir. 1986).
15. Rolls Royce Ltd. v. GTE Valcron Corp., No. 86-761, slip op. (Fed. Cir.
1986).
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cumstances related to the infringing conduct. 6 Several factors to be
considered have been enunciated by the Federal Circuit.
1. Exercise of Due Care in Avoiding Infringement
When a potential infringer has actual notice of an existing patent, there is an affirmative duty to exercise due care in determining
whether or not there is infringement of the patent rights." The affirmative duty includes obtaining competent legal advice from counsel before the initiation or continuance of any potentially infringing
activity.' 8 Failure to fulfill this duty is an adequate basis for assessment of treble damages. 19
More particularly, advice from counsel must include a well-reasoned evaluation of patent validity explicitly predicated on an analysis of the file histories of the patent, and an infringement evaluation comparing and contrasting the potentially infringing conduct
with the patented claims.20 However, since patents are presumed
valid,' advice as to patent validity which is based solely on review
of the prior art appearing in the file history of the patent application, does not rise to meet the affirmative duty.2
Thus, an attorney's advice which contains only bald, conclusory
and unsupported remarks regarding validity or infringement is insufficient for satisfying the affirmative duty. 2 Other factors which
are to be considered in determining whether the accused infringer
has complied with the affirmative duty is whether the attorney who
16. E.g., Central Soya Co. v. Geo. A. Hormel & Co., 723 F.2d 1573, 1577 (Fed.
Cir. 1983).
17. E.g., Ralston Purina Co. v. Far-Ma-Co, Inc., 772 F.2d 1570, 1577 (Fed. Cir.

1985); Underwater Devices, Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380, 1389 (Fed.
Cir. 1983).
18. E.g., Ralston Purina Co. v. Far-Ma-Co, Inc., 772 F.2d 1570, 1577 (Fed. Cir.
1985); Underwater Devices, Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380, 1390 (Fed.
Cir. 1983). While the C.A.F.C. in Ralston Purina stated that the affirmative duty
included seeking and obtaining competent legal advice before initiation of any possible infringing activity, citing Underwater Ralston Purina, the patent had not even
been issued until after the infringing conduct had started.
19. Great Northern Corp. v. Davis Core & Pad Co., No. 85-2485, slip op. (Fed.
Cir. 1986).
20. Underwater Devices, Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380, 1390
(Fed. Cir. 1983).
21. 35 U.S.C.A. § 282 (1984).
22. Central Soya Co. v. Geo. A. Hormel & Co., 723 F.2d 1573, 1576-77 (Fed. Cir.
1983). Thus, it is probably necessary that an attorney conduct a patent search before
rendering an opinion as to patent validity.
23. E.g., Kori Corp. v. Wilco Marsh Buggies and Draglines, Inc., 761 F.2d 649,
656 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 230 (1985); Underwater Devices, Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380, 1390 (Fed. Cir. 1983). But cf. Radio Steel & Mfg.
Co. v. MTD Products, Inc., 788 F.2d 1554, 1558-59 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (the C.A.F.C.
affirmed a finding of no willful infringement despite an oral opinion by patent counsel
which did not consider either the file history or the prior art for the patent-in-suit).
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provided the advice is a patent attorney, and whether the attorney

is in-house or outside counsel. 2'
Infringement is likely to be found willful when a defendant ignores the patent owner's letters regarding patent rights, without

studying the patent or consulting an attorney.2 5 When competent
legal advice is obtained, the accused infringer must reasonably and
in good faith adhere to the advice to avoid a finding of willful infringement.20 An infringer who ignores counsel's advice or delays
acting in accordance with the advice 2is7 in the same position as one
who fails to secure advice of counsel.
2.

Reasonable Belief of Non-Infringement or Invalidity

While an attorney's opinion on patent validity and infringement
is evidence of good faith conduct, such evidence is not dispositive in
determining willful infringement.28 Another factor which may contribute to a finding of willful infringement is that the infringer had
no reasonable basis for believing it had a right to do the infringing
acts." In other words, to have willful infringement, the infringer
must be acting in disregard of the patent,"0 or without an "honest
doubt" as to validity and infringement of the patent."' On the other
24. Underwater Devices, Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380, 1390
(Fed. Cir. 1983).
25. CPG Products v. Pegasus Luggage, Inc., 776 F.2d 1007, 1015 (Fed. Cir.
1985); Leinoff v. Louis Milona & Sons, 726 F.2d 734, 743 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
26. Central Soya Co. v. Geo. A. Hormel & Co., 723 F.2d 1573, 1577 (Fed. Cir.
1983). Judge Nichols of the C.A.F.C. has stated that advice by an attorney which is
qualified and without unequivocal conclusions regarding validity and infringement
does not provide guidance upon which a potential infringer may reasonably rely. Central Soya, 723 F.2d at 1581-82 (Nichols, J., concurring). Judge Nichols concludes that
a legal opinion must draw a clear line as to what conduct of the client is right and
wrong. The effect of Judge Nichols statement in Central Soya is not clear, in light of
his subsequent statement in Paper Converting Machine Co. v. Magna Graphics Corp.,
745 F.2d 11, 19 (Fed. Cir. 1984), that an accused infringer rarely knows whether his
product infringes a patent until a district court passes on the issue.
27. Central Soya, 723 F.2d at 1577.
28. E.g., Central Soya Co. v. Geo. A. Hormel & Co., 723 F.2d 1573, 1577 (Fed.
Cir. 1983); But cf. Great Northern Corp. v. Davis Core & Pad Co., No. 85-2485, slip
op. (Fed. Cir. 1986) (the C.A.F.C. held that failure to fulfill the affirmative duty to
obtain a validity and infringement opinion is an adequate basis to assess treble
damages).
29. E.g., King Instrument Corp. v. Otari Corp., 767 F.2d 853, 867 (Fed. Cir.
1985); Stickle v. Heublein, Inc., 716 F.2d 1550, 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1983). In Stickle, the
C.A.F.C. stated that even if the infringing acts were not inadvertent, such acts would
not necessarily constitute willful infringement. 716 F.2d at 1565. However, the Court
did not define inadvertent infringing acts. Presumably inadvertent infringing acts are
those done without knowledge of the patent. Accordingly, "not inadvertent" infringing acts would be acts done with knowledge of the patent, in which case, the potential
infringer has the affirmative duty to obtain advice of counsel and follow that advice.
30. Stickle v. Heublein, Inc., 716 F.2d 1550, 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
31. Rosemount, Inc. v. Beckman Industries, Inc., 727 F.2d 1549, 1548 (Fed. Cir.
1984).
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hand, an accused infringer who has a bona fide belief that the patent is invalid is serving the patent system by challenging that patent
in a lawsuit. Increased damages should not be imposed solely because the court later holds that belief to be unfounded."2
Generally, the fact that a potential infringer owns a patent covering the infringing product or method is irrelevant to the issue of
infringement." This is true because a second patent may distinguish
over a first patent for purposes of patentability, however, the conduct performed pursuant to the second patent may come within the
scope of the claims of the first patent."' Even so, an infringer's belief
that its conduct falls within its own patentably distinct claims while
falling outside the patent claims in issue is a factor to be considered
in determining willfulness of the infringement."
3. Other Factors
Even though a potential infringer having knowledge of a patent
has an affirmative duty to obtain competent legal advice concerning
validity and infringement of the patent, the absence of such advice
may be overcome by other circumstances such that a finding of willful infringement is inappropriate."6
One factor which has been considered in determining the willfulness of infringement is the manner in which the defendant's infringing conduct arose. For example, the fact that the defendant had
employed a highly experienced and knowledgeable employee of the
plaintiff shortly before the infringing conduct commenced, has contributed to a finding of willful infringement."'
Another factor to be considered is the infringer's effort to avoid
or design around the patent.38 One of the positive benefits of the
32. Kloster Speedsteel AB v. Stora Kopparbergs Bergslags AV, 793 F.2d 1565,
1581 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
33. State Industries, Inc. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 751 F.2d 1226, 1235 (Fed. Cir.
1985).
34. Rolls Royce, Ltd. v. GTE Valcron Corp., No. 86-761, slip op. (Fed. Cir.
1986). For example, a first patent on a chair may have claims calling for a seat supported by four legs. The second patent for a rocking chair may have claims calling for
a seat supported by four legs and rockers on the ends of the legs for allowing the
chair to rock back and forth. The second patent distinguishes over the first patent
due to the rockers. However, a rocking chair infringes the first patent since there is a
seat supported by four legs. Accordingly, the owner of the second patent cannot practice that invention without infringing the first patent.
35. King Instrument Corp. v. Otari Corp., 767 F.2d 853, 867 (Fed. Cir. 1985). In
King Instrument, the plaintiff's patent was cited as prior art in the infringing defend-

ant's patent.
36. E.g., King Instrument Corp. v. Otari Corp., 767 F.2d 853, 867 (Fed. Cir.

1985).

37. Central Soya Co. v. Geo. A. Hormel & Co., 723 F.2d 1573, 1575-76 (Fed. Cir.

1985).
38. Rolls-Royce, Ltd., No. 86-761, slip op. (Fed. Cir. 1986).
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patent system is its "negative incentive" to "design around" pat39
ented products, thus bringing innovations to the marketplace.
Classic competitive gamesmanship is not willful infringement and
should not be discouraged by increased damage awards.40 In other
words, the absence or presence of slavish copying of the patented
invention is a factor to be considered in determining willfulness of
41
infringement.
The Federal Circuit has also considered the nature of the accused infringer's challenge to the existence of infringement. Generally, an increase in damages for willfulness is inappropriate when
the defendant mounts a good faith challenge to the patent. 42 An accused infringer is defending in good faith as long as the defenses on
the issues of validity and infringement are not frivolous. 8
Events and circumstances surrounding license negotiations are
another element for consideration on the issue of willfulness. The
offering of a license is actual notice of the patent rights.4" In Ralston
Purina Co. v. Far-Ma-Co,4 the court held the infringement of the
patent to be willful since the defendant, without consulting patent
counsel, refused to take a license offered by the patent owner. 4" In
King Instruments Corp. v. Otari Corp.47 wherein the defendant requested a license from the patent owner plaintiff, the Court stated
that such license negotiations may support an infringer's good faith
if the infringer desired the license agreement as an alternative to
unaffordable or expensive litigation.'"
Continued production after notice of the patent rights is also a
consideration in determining willful infringement. 9 In Power Lift,
Inc. v. Lang Tools, Inc.,50 the patent owner accused the defendant of
infringing the patent claims on the day the patent issued and offered the defendant a license under the patent. The defendant refused the license offer and continued production of the infringing
product. The action for patent infringement was filed nine days af39. State Industries, Inc. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 751 F.2d 1226, 1236 (Fed. Cir.
1985); Yarway Corp. v. Eur-Control U.S.A., Inc., 775 F.2d 268, 277 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
40. State Industries, Inc. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 751 F.2d 1226, 1235-36 (Fed. Cir.
1985).
41. Id. at 1238.
42. Paper Converting Machine v. Magna-Graphics, 745 F.2d 11, 20 (Fed. Cir.
1984).
43. State Industries v. A.O. Smith Corp., 751 F.2d 1226, 1237 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
44. Ralston Purina Co. v. Far-Ma-Co, 772 F.2d 1570, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 1577.
47. King Instrument Corp., 767 F.2d at 867.
48. Id. This seems to imply that an infringer who requests a license and is refused is infringing less willfully than another who infringes without requesting a
license.
49. Power Lift, Inc. v. Lang Tools, Inc., 774 F.2d 478, 482 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
50. Id.
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ter the patent issued. The Court held that such continued production after notice of the patent rights was clear and convincing evidence of willfulness."
B. Bad Faith
The Federal Circuit has recently broadened the application of
increased damages beyond those cases involving willful infringement. In Yarway Corporationv. Eur-Control U.S.A., Inc.,5" a somewhat unusual case wherein the patent owner was being sued for infringing its own patent, 3 the court stated that increased damages
under 35 U.S.C. § 284 may be premised on either willful infringement or bad faith.54 Unfortunately, the court did not define "bad
faith" infringement. Based upon the patent system goal of promoting innovation by designing around existing patents, the court concluded that infringement resulting from attempts to invent around
the patent cannot constitute bad faith infringement for purposes of
increased damages." Such conduct is not sufficiently obnoxious to
outweigh the innovation incentive of the patent laws so as to justify
increased damages."'
III.

Standards for Attorney Fees

Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 285, the court may award reasonable
attorney fees in exceptional cases to the prevailing party. This is a
statutory exception to the "American Rule" of not assessing attorney fees against the losing party.57 Thus, an award of attorney fees
is within the discretion of the district court judge, once the prevailing party has established the exceptional nature of the case by clear
and convincing evidence.5
51.

Id.

52.

Yarway Corp., 775 F.2d at 268.

53.

Plaintiff Yarway had been granted an exclusive license from patent owner

Kalle, to manufacture, use, sell and distribute the patented product throughout the
United States. Subsequent to the licensing agreement Eur-Control began marketing a
similar product in the United States in competition with Yarway. Kalle and EurControl were owned and controlled by a common parent such that Eur-Control was
neither a wholly-owned subsidiary nor independent of Kalle. Therefore, Yarway
charged Eur-Control with infringement and Kalle with inducement of that infringement. 775 F.2d at 270.
54. 775 F.2d at 277. The district court had concluded that infringement was not
willful, but increased damages due to the bad faith efforts of the defendant to circumvent the patent license. 775 F.2d at 272-73. Thus, on appeal, the C.A.F.C. was
concerned only with the bad faith issue. 775 F.2d at 277.
55. 775 F.2d at 277-78. Willful infringement was not an issue on appeal.
56. Id.
57. Rohm and Haas Co. v. Crystal Chemical Co., 736 F.2d 688, 690 (Fed. Cir.),
cert. denied, 105 S.Ct. 221 (1984).
58. E.g., Machinery Corp. of America v. Gullfiber AB, 774 F.2d 467, 471 (Fed.
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The purpose of section 285 is to enable courts to prevent gross
injustice." In awarding attorney fees, the district courts should attempt to strike a balance between the interest of the patent owner
in protecting his statutory patent rights, and the interest of the public in confining such rights to their legal limits."0 Accordingly, attorney fees are available in exceptional cases to both the patent owner

and the accused infringer to compensate the prevailing party for its
monetary outlays in the prosecution or defense of the suit."'

Attorney fees include those sums incurred in the preparations
for and performance of legal services related to suit. 2 Fees are also

limited to those related to patent claims and other claims having
issues so intertwined with the patent issues that the evidence would
be material to both issues.6 3 In determining the reasonableness of an
award of attorney fees, there must be evidence of the number of
hours expended and the billing rate charged. 4
A.

Award to Patent Owner

Prevailing patent owners are often awarded attorney fees for an
exceptional case based on willful infringement. 5 An award of attorney fees to a patent owner is not an abuse of the district court's
discretion when a defendant has been found to be a willful
infringer.6 6
Attorney fees may also be granted to prevailing patent owners
for an exceptional case based on frivolous or bad faith defenses 7 or
Cir. 1985). In awarding attorney fees, the district court must specifically articulate
the facts which make the case exceptional. E.g., Reactive Metals and Alloys Corp. v.
ESM, Inc., 769 F.2d 1578, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1985). On appeal, the clearly erroneous
standard of review applies to the finding of exceptionality, whereas the exercise of the
trial court's discretion in awarding attorney fees is subject to reversal only if there is
an abuse of discretion. Reactive Metals and Alloys Corp. v. ESM, Inc., 769 F.2d 1578,
1583 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
59. Rohm and Haas Co. v. Crystal Chemical Co., 736 F.2d 688, 690 (Fed. Cir.),
cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 172 (1984). The purpose of the "American Rule" of attorney
fees is to avoid penalizing a party for merely defending a lawsuit. Id.
60. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc. v. Carter Wallace, Inc., 781 F.2d 198, 200 (Fed.
Cir. 1986).
61. Central Soya Co. v. Geo. A. Hormel and Co., 723 F.2d 1573, 1578 (Fed. Cir.
1983).
62. Id.
63. E.g., Stickle v. Heublein, Inc., 716 F.2d 1550, 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
64. Lam, Inc. v. Johns-Manville Corp., 718 F.2d 1056, 1068 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
65. E.g., Kori Corp. v. Wilco Marsh Buggies and Draglines, Inc., 761, F.2d 649
(Fed. Cir. 1985). See also S.C. Johnson and Son, Inc. v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 781 F.2d
198, 202 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (the C.A.F.C. remanded the case for clarification when the
district court did not award attorney fees after finding infringement to be willful).
66. E.g., S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc. v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 781 F.2d 198, 200
(Fed. Cir. 1986).
67. Stickle v. Heublein, Inc., 716 F.2d 1550, 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
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other litigation misconduct.6 8 While standard boilerplate answers to
an infringement complaint are not condoned, something more in the
way of vexatious tactics is necessary to establish defenses asserted in
bad faith.6" For example, an unfounded defense which is not pressed
at trial is an abuse of judicial process and may support an award of
attorney fees? 0 Defenses which are brought only for purposes of harrassment or delay may constitute an exceptional case for purposes of
awarding attorney fees.7" However, a defense which is meritless,
without being frivolous, has been found to be an insufficient basis
for an award of attorney fees.7 Finally, merely losing on the defenses of invalidity and non-infringement is not sufficient to make a
case exceptional."
The Federal Circuit has affirmed a trial court's award of attorney fees to the prevailing patentee in approximately 85% of the
cases where the issue has been raised on appeal.74
B. Award to Alleged Infringer
When the accused infringer is the prevailing party, attorney
fees may be awarded if the patent owner has litigated in bad faith,
or if fraud or other inequitable conduct was committed during prosecution of the patent application before the Patent Office.7 5 In either event, such gross injustices to the alleged infringer must be supported by proof of actual wrongful intent or gross negligence. 76
Thus, attorney fees may be awarded to an accused infringer due to
the misconduct of the patent owner with respect to the Patent Office or the alleged infringer. However, when an award of attorney
fees to an alleged infringer has been challenged on appeal, the Federal Circuit has affirmed the award in only 25% of the cases. 7
1. Inequitable Conduct Before the Patent Office
A patentee and his patent attorney have an uncompromising
duty of candor and good faith toward the Patent Office during the
68. Rolls Royce, Ltd., No. 86-761, slip op. (Fed. Cir. 1986).
69. Id.
70. Id. But cf. Stickle, 716 F.2d at 1564-65 (a defense withdrawn shortly before
trial will not necessarily support a finding of bad faith).
71. CTS Corp. v. Piher International Corp., 724 F.2d 1550, 1558 (Fed. Cir.),
cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 221 (1984).
72. Id. The C.A.F.C. in CTS did not define "meritless" or "frivolous".
73. State Industries, Inc. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 751 F.2d 1226, 1238 (Fed. Cir.
1984).
74. See Appendix 2.
75. Machinery Corp. of America v. Gullfiber AB, 774 F.2d 467, 472 (Fed. Cir.
1985).
76. Id. at 473.
77. See Appendix 2.
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prosecution of patent applications.7 8 Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. section
1.56(a), such duty encompasses the disclosure to the Patent Office of
information which may be material to the examination of the application. 79 Information is material where there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable Patent Office Examiner would consider the
information important in deciding whether to allow the application
to issue as a patent.80 Information can be material even though it
would not result in the rejection of the application. 8 A breach of the
duty of candor owed to the Patent Office will cause a patent to be
unenforceable.8 " Such a breach of duty occurs when material information is withheld from the Patent Office, and such withholding was
intentional or accompanied by gross negligence or bad faith. 8
Thus, inequitable conduct before the Patent Office is broader
than common law fraud and requires proof by clear and convincing
evidence of materiality and intent.8 ' Inequitable conduct encompasses affirmative acts of commission as well as omission." However,
evidence of simple negligence, oversight, or erroneous good faith
judgment not to disclose prior art is not sufficient to constitute inequitable conduct."
Direct evidence of acts as well as the natural consequences of
acts may be used to prove intent.8 7 Gross negligence, which is sufficient proof of intent, is present when the actor, judged as a reasonable person, in his position, should have known of the materiality of
the withheld reference.8 8 Thus, inference or direct evidence can be
used to prove intent.8 The existence of inequitable conduct is a factual issue. 90
Accordingly, when an alleged infringer succeeds in having a patent declared unenforceable on the basis of inequitable conduct
before the Patent Office, an award of attorney fees is appropriate. 9
78.
79.

Kansas Jack, Inc. v. Kuhn, 719 F.2d 1144, 1155 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
37 C.F.R. 1.56(a) (1985).

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id.
Driscoll v. Cebalo, 731 F.2d 878, 884 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
Hycor Corp. v. Schleuter Co., 740 F.2d 1529, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
Id. at 1538.
J.P. Stevens and Co. v. Lextex, Ltd., 747 F.2d 1553, 1559-60 (Fed. Cir.

1984).

85. Id. at 1559.
86. Orthopedic Equipment Co. v. All Orthopedic Appliances, Inc., 707 F.2d
1376, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 1983).

87. J.P. Stevens and Co. v. Lextex, Ltd., 747 F.2d 1553, 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1984);
Kansas Jack, Inc. v. Kuhn, 719 F.2d 1144, 1151 (Fed. Cir. 1983).

88. J.P. Stevens, 747 F.2d at 1560.
89. American Hoist and Derrick Co. v. Sowa and Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1363
(Fed. Cir. 1984).

90. J.P. Stevens, 747 F.2d at 1562.
91. See Interpart Corp. v. Italia, 777 F.2d 678 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Hughes v. Novi
American, Inc., 724 F.2d 122 (Fed. Cir. 1985).

19871

Damages and Attorneys' Fees

However, invalidation of a patent without a finding of inequitable
conduct before the Patent Office will not support an award of attorney fees to the accused infringer.9"
2.

Misconduct Towards Alleged Infringer

An alleged infringer who prevails on the issue of infringement
may also recover attorney fees when the litigation is vexatious, unjustified or frivolous.3 Attorney fees may also be awarded to the accused infringer when there is litigation misconduct by the patent
94
owner.
In awarding attorney fees to an accused infringer, the district
court must take into account the totality of circumstances surrounding the patent owner's conduct." One factor to consider is the patent owner's reasonableness in concluding that infringement exists.96
The patent owner has a duty to obtain competent legal advice as to
the issues of validity and infringement of the patent, similar to that
of the accused infringer with respect to willful infringement. 7 Thus,
the presence or absence of advice of counsel is evidence as to the
patent owner's state of mind, but does not conclusively establish the
"exceptionality" of the case."
Another factor for consideration in awarding attorney fees is
whether the patent-in-suit has been previously held invalid by another court." Generally, once a patent has been declared invalid, the
patent owner is collaterally estopped from asserting the validity of
the patent in a subsequent action.0 Even if the patent owner had a
full and fair opportunity to litigate the validity of the patent in the
92. See State Industries, Inc. v. Rheem, 762 F.2d 762 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Quaker
City Gear Works, Inc. v. Skil Corp., 747 F.2d 762 (Fed. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S.
Ct. 2676 (1985); Hycor Corp. v. Schleuter Co., 740 F.2d 1529 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Orthopedic Equipment Co. v. All Orthopedic Appliances, Inc., 707 F.2d 1376 (Fed. Cir.
1983).
93. E.g., Bayer Aktiengesellschaft v. Duphar International Research B.V., 738
F.2d 1237, 1242 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
94. Bayer, 738 F.2d at 1242 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
95. Machinery Corp. of America v. Gullfiber AB, 774 F.2d 467, 472-73 (Fed. Cir.
1985).
96. Id. at 473. See also Standard Oil Co. v. American Cyanamid Co., 774 F.2d
448, 455 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (baseless litigation); Bayer Aktiengesellschaft v. Duphar International Research B.V., 738 F.2d 1237, 1243 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (frivolous claim interpretation); Hughes v. Novi American, Inc., 724 F.2d 122, 124-25 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (no
good faith belief of infringement).
97. Machinery Corp., 774 F.2d at 472-73.
98. Id. at 473. Presumably, the standards for reasonableness of the advice of
counsel for the alleged infringer, see supra notes 14-31 and accompanying text, will
apply equally to the reasonableness of the advice of counsel for the patent owner.
99. Stevenson v. Sears-Roebuck & Co., 713 F.2d 705, 712-13 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
100. Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402
U.S. 313 (1971).
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previous suit, a subsequent suit for patent infringement is not an
exceptional case absent a finding of unfairness, bad faith, inequitable conduct, vexatious litigation or similar circumstances. 1 '
Abuse of discovery is another factor to consider in awarding attorney fees."0 ' For example, falsely answered interrogatories may
contribute to the finding of an exceptional case. 03
An alleged infringer, who commences a declaratory judgment
action for a declaration of patent invalidity and/or non-infringement
in response to charges of infringement, may also recover attorney
fees upon proof of actual wrongful intent or gross negligence on the
part of the patent owner in the infringement accusations.0 4 In
awarding attorney fees to the prevailing non-infringer in a declaratory judgment action, the district court should consider the relevant
facts surrounding the commencement of the suit. These facts include the patent owner and the accused infringer's conduct, the accused infringer's reasonable belief that the best recourse against the
patent owner was to file suit, unfair competition on the part of the
patent owner against the accused infringer, and the bearing of these
factors on the reasonable necessity to commence litigation.0 5
C. Award of Attorney Fees For Appeal
Neither the language of section 285 nor its legislative history
distinguishes between awarding attorney fees in the district court or
the appellate court. Since the purpose of section 285 is to prevent
injustice to a party involved in a patent suit, if the appeal itself is
exceptional, attorney fees may be granted.0 0
A frivolous appeal will justify an award of attorney fees. An appeal is frivolous if there is no plausible premise upon which reversal
can be based.10 7 If the arguments on appeal are reasonable and
101. Stevenson, 713 F.2d at 713.
102. Hughes v. Novi American, Inc., 724 F.2d 122, 126 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
103. Id. See also Reactive Metals and Alloys Corp. v. ESM, Inc., 769 F.2d 1578,
1583-85 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (award of attorney fees reversed since the falsity of interrogatory answers was not proven by clear and convincing evidence). Western Marine
Electronics, Inc. v. Furono Electric Co., 764 F.2d 840, 847 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (the
C.A.F.C. affirmed the trial court's denial of attorney fees despite falsely answered
interrogatories by the patent owner. The trial court had previously imposed monetary
sanctions against the patent owner for discovery abuse).
104. Machinery Corp. of America v. Gullfiber AB, 774 F.2d 467, 473 (Fed. Cir.
1985).
105. Id.
106. E.g., Rohm and Haas Co. v. Crystal Chemical Co., 736 F.2d 688, 692 (Fed.
Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 172 (1984).
107. Porter v. Farmers Supply Service, Inc., 790 F.2d 882, 887 (Fed. Cir. 1986);
Chemical Engineering Corp. v. Marlo, Inc., 754 F.2d 331, 335 (Fed. Cir. 1985); D.H.
Auld Co. v. Chroma Graphics Corp., 753 F.2d 1029, 1033 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
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presented in good faith, the appeal is not frivolous. 1 8 The Federal
Circuit has also indicated that misstatement of the record on appeal
may justify an award of attorney fees." 9 However, when new standards of law are established on appeal, attorney fees are not appropriate.'" An award of attorney fees for appeal may be assessed
against counsel, jointly and severally with the party represented."'
D.

Award of Double Costs

The Federal Circuit has awarded double costs on appeal for a
frivolous appeal pursuant to F.R.A.P. 38.112 While a definition of
frivolous appeal is difficult, an appeal is frivolous if the record,
briefs, or oral argument lack any basis for reversal of the district
a small chance of success is
courts decision."' An appeal that has
4
not frivolous for that reason alone."
Double costs on appeal may also be awarded against a party
who presents arguments lacking the candor mandated by the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct."" The Court has reasoned that conduct which imposed unnecessary costs on the parties and on the citizens whose taxes support the court, and also wastes the time of the
court and of the opposing counsel, is punishable." 6 For example, if
108. Shelcore, Inc. v. Durham Industries, Inc., 745 F.2d 621, 630 (Fed. Cir.
1984).
109. See Glaros v. H.H. Robertson Co., 230 U.S.P.Q. 393, 401 (Fed. Cir. 1986)
(the court stated that misstatement of the record normally would justify an award of
attorney fees incurred in the effort of opposing counsel to inform the court of the
truth. However, since appellee's counsel, who presumably knew the truth, failed to
contact appellant's counsel regarding the misstatements so that corrective documents
may have been unnecessary, attorney fees and costs were denied).
110. Rohm and Haas, 736 F.2d at 693.
111. Porter, 790 F.2d at 887; Chemical Engineering Corp., 754 F.2d at 335.
112. Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d 1542, 1553-55 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
The court awarded double costs plus $500 for the frivolous appeal. Id. at 1555. FED
R. APP. P. 38 (Damage for delay). If a court of appeals determines that an appeal is
frivolous, it may award just damages and single or double costs to an appellee. Id.
113. Connell, 722 F.2d at 1555.
114. Id. at 1554.
115. Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Manufacturing Co., 774 F.2d 1082, 1102-02
(Fed. Cir. 1985); Amstar Corp. v. Environtech Corp., 730 F.2d 1476, 1486 (Fed. Cir.
1984). See also Connell, 722 F.2d at 1554 (the C.A.F.C. awarded double costs plus
$500 to the alleged infringer for the frivolous appeal. No reason is given for the $500
portion of the award). American Bar Association, Model Rules of Professional Conduct and Code of Judicial Conduct (1983); Rule 3.3., Candor Toward the Tribunal,
provides, "(a) A lawyer shall not knowingly: (1) make a false statement of material
fact to a tribunal; (2) fail to disclose a material fact to a tribunal when disclosure is
necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by the client; (3) fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the client and not disclosed by opposing
counsel; or (4) offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. If a lawyer has offered
material evidence and comes to know of its falsity, the lawyer shall take reasonable
remedial measures."
116. See Amstar, 730 F.2d at 1486.
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an appeal argument distorts the record and misstates the law, in17
creased costs may be awarded for the prevailing party on appeal.
The party who prevailed at trial is not immune from an assessment
of double costs."'
IV.

Conclusion

Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. section 284, damages in patent infringement litigation may be trebled, in the discretion of the trial court.
Damages are often increased when infringement is found to be willful. In determining willfulness, the court must look to the totality of
circumstances surrounding the infringing conduct. A primary consideration is whether the infringer has satisfied the affirmative duty
to obtain and follow the well-reasoned advice of legal counsel. Other
factors to consider include a reasonable belief that the conduct occurred, efforts to avoid or design around the patent, the nature of
the defenses asserted against the claim of infringement, license negotiations, and continued infringement after receiving notice of the
patent rights.
In exceptional cases, the prevailing party may be awarded attorney fees, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. section 285. An exceptional case exists for a prevailing patent owner when infringement has been willful or when defenses have been asserted in bad faith or frivolously.
For an accused infringer who prevails, an exceptional case exists
when the patent has been procured through inequitable conduct in
the Patent Office, or when the patent owner has acted in bad faith
towards the alleged infringer. Attorney fees may also be awarded on
appeal in exceptional cases.
Finally, a party who appeals frivolously or who lacks candor in
its conduct before the court may be assessed increased costs.
Thus, the patent owner, the potential infringer, and their counsel, all have certain duties and responsibilities which arise both
before and during litigation. Parties who fail to meet these duties
and responsibilities potentially subject themselves to detrimental
monetary repercussions. "Caution" should be the watch word of the
day!

117. See Panduit, 774 F.2d at 1101-02; Amstar, 730 F.2d at 1486.
118. See Panduit, 774 F.2d at 1101-02; Amstar, 730 F.2d at 1486. In both
Panduit and Amstar, the C.A.F.C., without citing any statutory basis, assessed
double costs against the alleged infringer who had prevailed at trial. Federal Rule of
Appellate Procedure 38 allows damages and single or double costs to the appellee for
frivolous appeals.
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APPENDIX 1
C.A.F.C. DECISIONS RE:

INCREASED DAMAGES
District Court
Willful
Increased
C.A.F.C.

Case

Infringe.

Damages

Stickle v. Heublein, Inc.
716 F.2d 1550 (Fed. Cir.
1983)

Yes

No

Reversed (willful infringement)

Underwater Devices, Inc. v.
Morrison-Knudsen Co.,
717 F.2d 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1983)

Yes

Treble

Affirmed

Central Soya Co. v. Geo. A.
Hormel & Co.,
723 F.2d 1573 (Fed. Cir.
1983)

Yes

Double

Affirmed

Leinoff v. Louis Milona & Sons,
Inc.,
726 F.2d 734 (Fed. Cir. 1984)

Yes

Treble

Affirmed

Rosemount, Inc. v. Beckman
Industries, Inc.,
727 F.2d 1540 (Fed. Cir. 1984)

Yes

Treble

Affirmed

Paper Converting Machine Co. v.
Magna-Graphics Corp.,
745 F.2d 11 (Fed. Cir.
1984)

Yes

Treble

Remanded

State Industries, Inc. v. A. 0.
Smith Corp.,
751 F.2d 1226 (Fed. Cir. 1985)

Yes

Treble

Reversed

Shatterproof Glass Corp. v.
Libbey-Owens Ford Co.,
758 F.2d 613 (Fed. Cir. 1985)

No

No

Affirmed

Kori Corp. v. Willco Marsh
Buggies & Draglines, Inc.,
761 F.2d 649 (Fed. Cir.),

Yes

Double

Affirmed

King Instrument Corp. v.
Otari Corp.,
767 F.2d 853 (Fed. Cir. 1985)

No

No

Affirmed

Ralston Purina Co. v. Far-Mar-Co.
772 F.2d 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1985)

Yes

Ruling
Reserved

Affirmed

American Original Corp. v.
Jenkins Food Corp.,
774 F.2d 459 (Fed. Cir. 1985)

No

No

Affirmed

Power Lift, Inc. v. Lang Tools,
774 F.2d 478 (Fed. Cir. 1985)

Yes

?

Affirmed

cert. denied 106 S.Ct.

230 (1985)
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Bad
faith

Increased
by 50%

Reversed

CPG Products Corp. v. Pegasus
Luggage, Inc.,
776 F.2d 1007 (Fed. Cir.
1985)

No

No

Reversed

S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc. v.
Carter-Wallace, Inc.,
781 F.2d 198 (Fed. Cir. 1986)

Yes

No

Affirmed
(willful infringement)
remanded (increased damages)

Great Northern Corp. v.
Davis Core & Pad Co.,
No. 85-2485, slip op.
(Fed. Cir. 1986)

Yes

Treble

Affirmed

Radio Steel & Mfg. Co. v.
MTD Products, Inc.,
788 F.2d 1554 (Fed. Cir.
1986)

No

No

Affirmed

Kloster Speedsteel AB v.
Stora Kopparbergs Bergslags AB,
793 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir.
1986)

No

No

Remanded

Shiley, Inc. v. Bentley
Laboratories, Inc.,
794 F.2d 1561 (Fed. Cir.
1986)

Yes

Double

Affirmed

Rolls-Royce, Ltd. v. GTE
Valeron Corp.,
No. 86-761, slip op. (Fed.
Cir. 1986)

No

No

Affirmed

Pacific Furniture Mfg. Co. v.
Preview Furniture Corp.,
No. 86-787, slip op.
(Fed. Cir. 1986)

Yes

Treble

Affirmed

Yarway Corp. v. Eur-Control

USA, Inc.,
775 F.2d 268 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
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APPENDIX 2
C.A.F.C. DECISIONS RE:

ATTORNEY FEES
District Court
Attorney Fee Award

Case

Granted
To

Orthopedic Equipment Co. v.
All Orthopedic Appliances,
Inc.,
707 F.2d 1376 (Fed. Cir.
1983)
Stevenson v. Sears, Roebuck
& Co.,
713 F.2d 705 (Fed. Cir. 1983)

Denied
To
Alleged
Infringer

Alleged
Infringer

White Consolidated Industries
Inc. v. Vega Servo-Control, Inc.
713 F.2d 788 (Fed. Cir. 1983)

C.A.F.C.
Affirmed

Reversed

Alleged
Infringer

Affirmed

Stickle v. Heublein, Inc.,
716 F.2d 1550 (Fed. Cir.
1983)

Patent
Owner

Reversed

Lam, Inc. v. Johns-Manville
Corp.,
718 F.2d 1056 (Fed. Cir.
1983)

Patent

Affirmed

Central Soya Co. v. Geo. A.
Hormel & Co.,
723 F.2d 1573 (Fed. Cir.
1983)

Patent
Owner

Affirmed

Hughes v. Novi American, Inc.,
724 F.2d 122 (Fed. Cir. 1984)

Alleged

Affirmed

Rosemount, Inc. v. Beckman
Industries, Inc.,
727 F.2d 1540 (Fed. Cir. 1984)

Patent
Owner

Affirmed

CTS Corp. v. Piher International
Corp.,
727 F.2d 1550 (Fed. Cir.),
cert. denied 105 S.Ct. 221
(1984)

Patent
Owner

Affirmed

Radio Steel & Mfg. Co. v. MTD
Products, Inc.,
731 F.2d 840 (Fed. Cir.),
cert. denied 105 S.Ct. 119
(1984)

Patent
Owner

Affirmed

Bayer Aktiengesellschaft v.
Duphar International Research
B.V.,
738 F.2d 1237 (Fed. Cir. 1984)

Alleged
Infringer

Remanded
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Hycor Corp. v. Schleuter Co.,
740 F.2d 1529 (Fed. Cir. 1984)

Alleged
Infringer

Reversed

Peterson Mfg. Co. v. Central
Purchasing, Inc.,
740 F.2d 1541 (Fed. Cir. 1984)

Alleged
Infringer

Reversed

Western Marine Electronics,
Inc. v. Furuno Electric Co.,
754 F.2d 840 (Fed. Cir. 1985)

Alleged
Infringer

Affirmed

King Instruments Corp. v.
Otari Corp.,
767 F.2d 853 (Fed. Cir. 1985)

Patent
Owner

Affirmed

State Industries, Inc. v. Rheem
Mfg. Co.,
769 F.2d 762 (Fed. Cir. 1985)

Alleged
Infringer

Reversed

Reactive Metals and Alloys Corp.,
v. ESM, Inc.,
769 F.2d 1578 (Fed. Cir.
1985)

Alleged
Infringer

Reversed

Great Northern Corp. v.
Davis Core & Pad Co.,
No. 85-2485, slip op.
(Fed. Cir. 1986)

Patent
Owner

Affirmed

Radio Steel & Mfg. Co. v.
MTD Products, Inc.
788 F.2d 1554 (Fed. Cir. 1986)

Patent
Owner

Affirmed

Kloster Speedsteel AB v. Stora
Kopparbergs Bergslags AB,
793 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1986)

Patent
Owner

Affirmed

Shiley, Inc. v. Bentley Laboratories, Inc.,
794 F.2d 1561 (Fed. Cir.
1986)

Patent
Owner

Rolls-Royce, Ltd. v. GTE
Valeron Corp.,
No. 86-761 slip op.
(Fed. Cir. 1986)
Pacific Furniture Mfg. Co. v.
Preview Furniture Corp.,
No. 86-787, slip op.
(Fed. Cir. 1986)

Affirmed

Patent
Owner

Patent
Owner

Affirmed

Affirmed
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APPENDIX 3
C.A.F.C. DECISIONS RE:

ATTORNEY FEES FOR APPEAL
Granted to

Denied to

Rohm & Haas Co. v. Crystal
Chemical Co.,
736 F.2d 688 (Fed. Cir.),
cert. denied 105 S.Ct.
172 (1984)

Alleged infringer

Shelcore, Inc. v. Durham
Industries, Inc.,
745 F.2d 621 (Fed. Cir. 1984)

Alleged Infringer

D. H. Auld Co. v. Chroma
Graphics Corp.,
753 F.2d 1029 (Fed. Cir.
1985)

Alleged infringer

Chemical Engineering Corp. v.
Marlo, Inc.,
754 F.2d 331 (Fed. Cir.
1985)

Alleged infringer

Porter v. Farmers Supply
Service, Inc.,
790 F.2d 882 (Fed. Cir.
1986)

Alleged infringer

Glaros v. H. H. Robertson Co.
230 U.S.P.Q. 393 (Fed.
Cir. 1986)

Patent Owner
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APPENDIX 4
C.A.F.C. DECISIONS RE:

DOUBLE COSTS ON APPEAL

Case

Granted to

Amstar Corp. v. Environtech Corp.,
730 F.2d 1476 (Fed. Cir. 1984)

Appellant/patent
owner

Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
722 F.2d 1542 (Fed. Cir. 1983)

Appellee/alleged
infringer

Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co.,
774 F.2d 1082 (Fed. Cir. 1985)

Appellant/patent
owner

